Working Papers

Abstract. Fertility rates in many developed countries have fallen to historically low levels, renewing attention to the constraints that shape reproductive decision-making. In Spain, low fertility is closely tied to reduced progression beyond the first child, making fertility intentions among parents especially important. This paper builds upon Rutigliano and Lozano (2022) by revisiting the relationship between grandparental childcare support and short-term fertility intentions using nationally representative data from the 2018 Spanish Fertility Survey. It extends their study by applying a Beckerian constraint-based framework and by centering the distinction between co-residential and non-residential support in the explanation of gendered differences in fertility intentions.

Using gender-stratified logistic regression models across a series of specifications, the analysis finds that grandparental support is positively associated with short-term fertility intentions among Spanish parents aged 18–45 with at least one biological child in the household. Among women, only non-residential grandparental support is associated with higher fertility intentions. Among men, the positive association is concentrated among fathers receiving co-residential support, particularly those with two or more children; because the male co-residential subgroup is small, small-sample diagnostics suggest a reasonably robust but imprecisely estimated association. These findings contribute to research on low fertility by showing that informal intergenerational support should not be treated as a uniform resource: its association with fertility intentions varies by gender, parity, and household arrangement.

Abstract. The Cuban Revolution marked the death of an old regime and the birth of not just a new government, but also a new generation of Cubans. Using crude birth rates and the synthetic control method, we provide the first causal estimate of the Revolution’s effect on fertility and confirm that it produced a post-revolutionary baby boom. Between 1959 and 1965, the Revolution increased Cuba’s crude birth rate by an average of 6.69 births per 1,000 people. However, the boom coincided with a sharp increase in infant mortality. Adjusting births for infant mortality reduces the estimated demographic effect by 17.9%. We estimate that the Revolution produced 346,107 additional births and 284,488 additional surviving infants. The unusual simultaneous increase in fertility and infant mortality departs from the conventional demographic transition pattern and is consistent with economic models in which households increase births when child-survival probabilities deteriorate.

Abstract. This paper asks whether state-run export inspection is actually necessary to sustain trade in markets with severe asymmetric information. We study New York, the leading U.S. export hub, which in the 1840s first made public inspection voluntary (1843) and then abolished inspection offices entirely (1846). Using state-level exports per capita from 1830–1860 and a synthetic control design, we compare New York’s post-reform trajectory to a counterfactual “synthetic New York” built from states that retained mandatory inspection. New York and its synthetic track closely before reform; afterward, New York’s exports per capita rise to roughly two to three times those of its synthetic counterpart. Placebo tests and alternative intervention dates show that this divergence is highly unlikely to be spurious. The results provide causal evidence that dismantling a long-standing public inspection regime increased exports rather than triggering the collapse predicted by standard “lemons” arguments. Interpreted through a measurement-cost lens, the findings imply that private branding, merchant associations, and reputational mechanisms can organize quality assurance at lower cost than politicized state inspection — challenging modern claims that public “export quality infrastructure” is a necessary precondition for integration into world markets.

Abstract. This paper coins the term “Silver Age of Mercenaries” to describe the resurgence of mercenary employment in Europe from 1618 to 1714. It argues that population decline during the crisis of the seventeenth century raised the relative price of domestically sourced military labor, increasing rulers’ incentives to hire foreign mercenaries as a substitute for domestic soldiers beyond what regime popularity alone can explain. I extend the model developed by Leeson and Piano (2021) by incorporating demographic contraction, operationalized as a shrinking recruitment base, as an independent driver of mercenary reliance. This extension explains why mercenary reliance recurs across distinct historical eras, rather than varying only with a ruler’s political security.

I test this prediction using a natural experiment from the Republic of Venice. Two outlying Mediterranean island possessions, Cyprus and Crete, came under siege by the Ottoman Empire in the Fourth (1570–1573) and Fifth (1645–1669) Venetian-Ottoman Wars. Venice’s population, however, never recovered from the plague of 1575–77 and did not exceed its pre-plague peak again until 1951, leaving its recruitment base sharply diminished by the time of the Fifth War. Consistent with the model, the mercenary share of Venice’s besieged garrisons rose from roughly 38 percent in the Fourth War to over 90 percent in the Fifth. The findings suggest that demographic contraction is an independent driver of mercenary reliance, distinct from regime insecurity, with implications for states facing similar pressures today, including Russia and Ukraine.